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Introduction
 This paper focuses on the strategic failure of Toshiba with special reference to M&A of 
Westinghouse Electric Co. and the accompanying project management of U.S. based nuclear 
power plants. The downfall of the overseas large-sized project led Toshiba to corner the 
verge of bankruptcy. It also brought about an unprecedented scandal of a window-dressing 
settlement of accounts which had never been observed since the company was established 
in 1939. 
 The paper is mainly delineated on the basis of secondary materials written in Japanese 
which centers on the strategic blunder of Toshiba in terms of the analysis of chronological 
causal relationship between Toshiba and the catastrophic consequences of overseas nuclear 
power business(1) . The lesson learned is a stepping stone for a further research of overseas 
post-merger integration problem of the private-based infrastructure direct investment 
leading to the toppling of a parent company.
Toward the Minefield 
 Toshiba, a gigantic Japanese corporation was teetering on the edge of bankruptcy in 2017. 
Many business divisions were sold to both Japanese rivals vying with Toshiba and foreign 
equity funds which were interested in the stake of the moribund company. Presently, 
Toshiba is regarded as a less cohesive corporation which lacks a promising international 
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impetus and competitiveness. Moreover, Toshiba slips away from robust engagement of 
overseas private infrastructure direct investment which is construed as the next generation 
industrial driving force of not only Toshiba per se but also all Japanese heavy industry. 
What led Toshiba to such a catastrophe which could be never envisioned in the rosy game 
plan?
 The overriding lesson of Toshiba shows the risk of private-based infrastructure direct 
investment and post-merger integration. In the early 2000’s, the industrial circumstances of 
Toshiba favored the expansion of nuclear power plant project. 
 First, in 2001, Nuclear Power Renaissance was endorsed by President G.W. Bush in order 
to lessen carbon dioxide emissions which were caused by thermal power plants. Second, 
corresponding to the G.W. Bush administration initiative, the official commanding height of 
Japanese industrial policy, METI (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) encouraged 
Japanese multinational corporations which dealt with nuclear power business to advance 
overseas. Toshiba, Mitsubishi-Heavy Industry and Hitachi were strongly recommended 
to establish nuclear power reactors overseas. Toshiba was welcomed and targeted as a 
mainstay of national economic policy by the higher echelons of METI. Tadao Yanase and 
Naoya Imai in METI were main influential facilitators for overseas expansion of Japanese 
nuclear energy policy.
Heyday of Nishida
 On June, 2005, Atsutoshi Nishida(2) took office of the CEO of Toshiba at the time when the 
existing product lines of the company were rapidly losing overseas competitive advantages 
and cutting edges overtaken by burgeoning rivalries coming from Korea and China, in 
addition to the shrinking market from the collapse of IT bubble economy in the early 2000s. 
It is said that his promotion to the CEO was attributed to the blockbuster of PC campaign 
in the U.S. he assertively promoted. Nishida was regarded as a charismatic and self-assured 
figure.
 Toshiba took advantage of the opportunity to buy out a subsidiary of BNFL (British 
Nuclear Fuels Limited), Westinghouse Electric Co. which was located in Pennsylvania, the 
U.S. in 2006. The reason why Toshiba intended to acquire a subsidiary of England-based 
holding company was that Westinghouse electric Co., a historically prestigious U.S. company 
produced PWR(Pressurized Water Reactor) which Toshiba had no technological know-how 
enough to architect while Toshiba long deployed nuclear power-related business on only 
(2) Nishida was a Ph.D. student who majored in philosophy at Tokyo University before he worked for Toshiba. 
However, Nishida was not singled out as a regular employee on the basis of entrenched Japanese employment 
system. He was employed as a local worker at the subsidiary in Toshiba incorporated in Iran. This means 
that he was not supposed to have any good perspective which was to be promoted to middle management 
in the headquarters of Toshiba, let alone top management in the organizational context of leading Japanese 
corporations.
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BWR(Boiling Water Reactor). Top management in Toshiba cashed in on the opportunity to 
go global although Toshiba had no experience to make any large-sized overseas M&A.
 The competing bidders were Hitachi, Areba, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and GE. Toshiba 
succeeded in purchasing 650 billion yen for the buyout. The competitor, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry stated in an interview that Toshiba overestimated the value of Westinghouse 
Electric Co. However, the stock value of Toshiba surged 400 yen to 1000 yen per share only 
after Nishida assumed office of CEO and concurrently, huge investment in the new factory 
of semiconductor were carried out under the strategy of “focus and selection”. Nishida was 
praised for an excellent top business leader of Japanese leading company with a profound 
insight and strong leadership. Hence, he was beginning to be considered as a next candidate 
of the chairman in Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) which represented an official 
spokesperson of Japanese economic and industrial policy. Toshiba was a renowned company 
which sent the two CEOs to Keidanren in the past.
Invisible Risk
 It should be noted that Toshiba asked The Shaw Group which was a Louisiana based 
engineering company in the U.S. for a financial cooperation to realize the contract of large-
sized M&A of Westinghouse Electric Co. because the Japanese major trading company, 
Marubeni suddenly cancelled financing for this takeover bid. Financing of The Shaw Group 
took preference of put option. This means that Toshiba was required to pay back 120 
billion yen to The Shaw Group unilaterally whenever The Shaw Group required Toshiba to 
convert the bond to cash in exercising put option. 
 On March, 2008, Toshiba made a successful bid to nuclear power reactors under the name 
of South Texas Project (STP) which was schemed by NRG Energy located in the suburbs 
of Huston, Texas. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), an improved version of BWR 
was introduced into STP by the independent technological development of Toshiba without 
the cooperation of knowhow of Westinghouse Electric Co. Nuclear Power business was 
continuously extended to Kazakhstan, Italia, China, Niger, and England until Toshiba was 
involved in the financial scandal. It was doubtful whether post-merger integration went well 
after Westinghouse Electric Co. was annexed to Toshiba.
 Shigenori Shiga was a key person who was the most responsible for coordination between 
Toshiba and Westinghouse to propel synergy effects. He served as the chief coordination 
officer and senior vice president of Westinghouse from December 2006 to July 2010. He 
served as the chairman of Westinghouse from July 2010 to July 2016. Shigenori Shiga may 
have been a titular leader partly because he didn’t have enough overseas management 
experiences to handle Westinghouse and partly because he couldn’t convincingly and 
effectively make himself understood in English to the local subordinates. 
 It was frequently voiced that management of Westinghouse Electric Co. was independently 
run by the U.S. nationals though the two joint different managerial climates seemingly 
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converged into a single organization. It can be easily interpreted that there was a big 
communication discrepancy in the decision making processes between two different 
nationals on grounds U.S. nationals were self-confident about the knowledge of nuclear 
power construction.
 In succeeding Steve Tritch (CEO of Westinghouse from 2002 to 2008), Aris Candris, a 
business expert of nuclear power reactor construction hold the position of CEO from July 
2008 to April 2012. Before he resigned, he put it, “The Executive Office reflects the global 
nature of Westinghouse’s operations, the potential for significant growth within all market 
segments, and the challenges associated with conducting business in such a heavily 
regulated and closely scrutinized industry.”(3)  It was an ominous statement.
 On April, 2012, Jim Ferland unexpectedly renounced the position of CEO days before 
he officially took office as the CEO of Westinghouse Co. Shigenori Shiga took the intrim 
CEO of Westinghouse. On September, 2012, Daniel Roderick was appointed as the CEO 
of Westinghouse Electric Co. Less than five years, on March 2017, he was pushed out 
of the chairmanship of Westinghouse Electronic Co. with more than 19 million dollars’ 
compensation package.
Doomed Day
 According to the Nishida’s sharp leadership with a far-sighted plan, it appeared that the 
overseas nuclear project proceeded smoothly. However, the big earthquake and ensuing 
tsunami on March 11, 2011 left Toshiba in a quandary. The total destruction of Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear reactors threatened deferment of Toshiba’s ambitious project. Taking into 
consideration of vulnerability to natural havocs over nuclear power reactors, Germany 
cancelled all the projects of nuclear power reactors construction by 2020. Switzerland 
abolished the blueprint of nuclear power construction which was to be carried out by 
2025.  It was estimated that the maintenance and repair cost of nuclear reactor would 
increase to the point to which the safety criteria of the existing nuclear power reactors 
could be intactly vindicated. It could be also easily imagined that the new proposal of 
budget for the construction cost would be by far beyond the one which was evaluated 
before the earthquake and tsunami caused the serious damage of Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear reactors. Notwithstanding this devastating upheaval, the total loss of nuclear power 
reactors in Fukushima gave a favorable opportunity to make Toshiba consider a daring 
strategic retreat from the nuclear power business. However, management didn’t take into 
consideration about the consequence of unprecedented natural disaster accident which 
gradually besieged the company with dark clouds.  
(3) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/westinghouse-president-and-ceo-aris-candris-to-retire-effective-
march-31-136967303.html
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Disjunction between Toshiba and Westinghouse Electric Co. 
 After the acquisition of Westinghouse Electric Co., the management of Westinghouse 
Electric Co. was not substantially directed by the parent company, Toshiba. Management of 
Westinghouse Electric Co. was entrusted with autonomy by the senior executives of U.S. 
nationals. Westinghouse Electric Co. independently contracted the projects: two Georgia-
based Vogtle nuclear power stations and South Carolina-based VC Summer nuclear power 
stations. These reactors provided with AP1000 (4) which was regarded as a state of the art 
nuclear power energy technology. 
 However, Westinghouse Electric Co. had no longer sophisticated project management know-
how and the top notch technology enough to cope with construction of these contracted 
nuclear plants because the company was not involved in nuclear power construction for 
two decades. The construction of new projects was meanderingly delayed. The cost surged 
due to the delay in construction which was three years behind schedule. Correspondingly, 
Toshiba was overwhelmed by cost overruns which yielded the enormous loss. 
Dysfunctional Corporate Governance
 In running parallel with the project of nuclear power reactors which were being 
constructed in the U.S. and China, Toshiba committed itself to illegal transaction called 
“price-masking”(5) which superficially contributed to the manufacturing cost reduction with 
dexterous accounting manipulation. The fabrication of window-dressing of settlement of 
counts from inside the headquarters was confidentially contrived in order to compensate the 
huge amount loss incurred by overseas nuclear power plant construction. It is evident that 
this improper accounting manipulation by top management deteriorated corporate 
governance and internal control which covered the strategic maneuvering of overseas 
operations. All the external directors of Toshiba were excluded from the decision making 
about the illicit conduct of accounting manipulation. Corporate governance did not 
substanciate the strict serveilance despite the introduction of external director system.
(4) The AP1000 is a nuclear power plant originally formulated and marketed by Westinghouse Electric Company. 
Different from the boiling water reactor (BWR), the plant with AP1000 is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
with improved use of passive nuclear safety. This advanced technology allows nuclear cores to be cooled even 
in the absence of operator interventions or mechanical assistance. It does not require any active intervention 
on the part of the operator or electronic feedback in order to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state in the 
event of emergency relating to natural disasters or human erroneous operations. See, https://www.smartgrid.
gov/files/AP_1000_Nuclear_Power_Plant_200808.pdf
(5) Price masking was called as “buy-sell” in Japan. In exemplification of “buy-sell transaction in relation to 
Toshiba, see, https://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/en/news/20150725_1.pdf
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Slapdash M&A strategy
 On July 2012, it was announced that global engineering, procurement and construction 
company, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) was to acquire the Shaw Group in a 
transaction worth an estimated $ 3 billion. CB&I Shaw became one of world’s largest energy 
industry engineering and construction companies. The acquisition was completed in early 2013.
 In December 2015, Westinghouse Electric Co. took over Stone & Webster(S&W) which 
was the EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) company for a purpose of 
implementing nuclear power plant construction under a strictly direct control of project 
management. In hindsight, this was a desperate blunder in that Toshiba was shackled and 
saddled with heavy debts. It turned out that S&W was saddled with the debt which was 
tantamount to about 1 billion dollars after such a dicey M&A. 
 In the meantime, CB&I managed to walk away from the nuclear power business, by 
exercising the put option clause contracted between The Shaw Group and Toshiba which 
dated back to the year, 2006. It is doubtful whether a resourceful M&A team was well-
organized by top management of Toshiba in making allowance for such a rough-and-ready 
M&A. Toshiba didn’t carry out the due diligence over S&W with meticulous scrutiny. 
Toshiba never comprehended the shrewd strategy of CB & I, based on the fact that The 
Shaw Group bought out Stone & Webster in 2000 before The Shaw Group was owned by 
CB & I in 2013. With these factors considered, it is conceivable that Toshiba was trapped by 
a strategic intrigue contrived by CB & I. 
The Third Party Committee
 On February, 2015, Toshiba was inspected by Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission in Japan with respect to the problem of improper accounting procedures. 
Correspondingly, Toshiba set up a special investigation committee in the company on April, 
2015 but didn’t work well. On May, 2015, for a purpose of inspecting the whole business 
divisions of Toshiba, the third party committee was organized in accordance with the 
regulatory recommendation conducted by Nihon Bengoshi Rengo-kai (Japan Federation 
of Bar Associations). Consequently, the official report on closing accounts of the year was 
postponed and at the same time, payment of dividend for shareholders was cancelled for the 
year. The stock plunged in response to these two inappropriate demeanors of Toshiba. 
 The final report of the third committee party revealed that Toshiba was committed to the 
improper accounting procedures since 2001 at the time when Tadashi Okamura took office 
of CEO. The cliquish mold of Toshiba in the autocratic organization was disclosed through 
the report. It was estimated that the book value depreciation of fixed assets amounted to 
15 billion yen in addition to the padded profits worth about 150 billion yen. The committee 
demanded that Toshiba redress a series of financial reports published since 2011. Nishida, 
Sasaki, and Tanaka stepped down from all the positions related to Toshiba immediately after 
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the report was issued. Tadashi Muromachi was appointed as the next CEO. However, the 
financial crisis of Toshiba continued because the financial problem of Westinghouse Electric 
Co. was intentionally excluded in the seemingly fair and impartial-based report made by the 
third party committee. Intervention to rule out the problem of Westinghouse electric Co. 
was made by the law firm in charge of Toshiba. On July 7, 2015, Toshiba filed for a damage 
suit against the successive CEOs such as Nishida, Sasaki, and Tanaka including two former 
CFOs who had already resigned corresponding to the official reprimand announcement of 
report made by the third party committee.
Quagmire of Indebtedness
 On September, 2015, the stocks of Toshiba was assigned under the supervision to see if 
they should be delisted from Tokyo Stock Market in accordance with the recommendation 
of the third party committee. On November 12, 2015, it was announced in the media that 
Westinghouse Electronic Co. made the book value depreciation of fixed asset worth 1.5 
billion dollars. Toshiba admitted this fact that Westinghouse Electric Co. should have disclosed 
the loss at the announcement of fiscal paper on 2012. Subsequently, on 27 November 2015, 
Toshiba apologized for this negligence which means that the huge loss of Westinghouse 
Electronic Co. was excluded from the 2013 consolidated financial report of the holding 
company. The U.S. -based subsidiary was virtually teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. 
However, the obligation of disclosure was exempted from the consolidated financial report 
because Westinghouse Electric Co. was the unlisted company. This was an ominous sign 
that Toshiba would fall into the huge liabilities in excess of assets and face insolvency 
eventually. The CEO, Muromachi stated in an official interview that Westinghouse was 
going well despite the huge accumulated loss coming from the cumbersome construction 
projects for the nuclear power plants. This statement was nothing but groundless, wishful 
thinking. 
Clashes between Toshiba and Auditing Companies
 Toshiba changed the audit corporations three times in order to conceal the huge loss 
incurred by recurrently prolonged construction schedules of the U.S. nuclear power plants 
and accompanying cost overruns of nuclear power plants based in the U.S. The biggest 
problem was in relation to the goodwill of Westinghouse Electric Co. because the fair value 
was evidently impaired, compared to that in 2007 at the time when M&A of Westinghouse 
Electric Co. was implemented. 
 The goodwill had to be depreciated to a great extent to which the impaired assets were 
(6) Shin-Nihon-Kansa-Houjin (New Japan Audit Corporation) in Japan is affiliated with E&Y. E&Y was in charge of 
Westinghouse and the related companies of Toshiba incorporated in the U.S. whereas Shin-Nihon Kansa was in 
charge of Toshiba.
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squarely evaluated. The names of audit corporations affiliated with Toshiba were Ernst and 
Young (E&Y) (6) , PwC Aarata, and Deloitte and Tohmatsu Consulting in order. All of three 
audit corporations strongly urged Toshiba to disclose the loss to the public. 
 Toshiba rejected the proposals presented by three audit advisory companies with a strong 
apprehension because the candid disclosure of Westinghouse Electric Co. was leading up to 
a further book value depreciation of the fix assets. This conduct was equivalent to window-
dressing settlement of accounts which would be followed by delisting and the bankruptcy. 
For these reasons, it was often inferred that the audit companies were incapable of seeing 
through the malicious intent of accounting manipulation rigged by Toshiba. In this regard, it 
can be postulated that the audit companies involved in the Toshiba case should be criticized 
for the lack of facilitative revival plan between audit companies and Toshiba.
Chapter 11 & Reluctant Divesture 
 On March, 2017, Westinghouse Electric Co. and Toshiba Nuclear Energy Holding filed for 
chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Concomitantly, the bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric 
Co. put an end the construction of four nuclear power plants in China. The total loss of 2017 
fiscal year surged to 1,01 trillion yen. The CEO, Tsunakawa stated in an interview that 
Westinghouse Electric Co. made this decision by itself despite the fact that the company 
was 100% owned by Toshiba. This was an inconsistent statement revealing that he had no 
substantial managing power over Toshiba.
 After the shocking announcement, Toshiba was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Toshiba had no choice but to make divesture of lion’s shares financially contributing to the 
headquarters in order to compensate the huge loss, avoid the delisting from Tokyo Stock 
Market and to stave off the strict control of banks which financed Toshiba. The leading-first 
tier subsidiary, Toshiba Medical Systems was sold to Canon at the price of 665,5 billion yen 
on December 2016. Goldman Socks was a managing underwriter for increasing capitalization. 
The deferred tax payment worth 30 billion yen was indemnified by the profit in return for 
this divesture. In the same month of the year, Toshiba Lifestyle was sold to Mei Da Jituan (美
的集団) based in China. The divesture price was 53,7 billion yen. This subsidiary dealt with 
large household appliances which were very familiar to Japanese. Consecutively, Toshiba 
Semiconductor, a gold mine for the company was sold to Japan-U.S.-Korea joint venture 
through the underwriter of Bain Capital Private Equity Fund at the price of about 2 trillion 
yen on June 2018. 
Organizational Conflicts in the Top Echelons
 As for the successive CEOs of Toshiba since 2010s, Management in Toshiba was in 
turbulence throughout their terms of the CEOs. The long-lasting economic recession 
damaged overall operations of the company after Leman Shock in 2008. During a short 
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period of nearly ten years, the CEOs changed with bewildering rate. Atsutoshi Nishida was 
succeeded by Norio Sasaki on June, 2009. Norio Sasaki was succeeded by Hisao Tanaka on 
June, 2013. Hisao Tanaka was succeeded by Tadashi Muromachi on June, 2014. Tadashi 
Muromachi was succeeded by Satoru Tsunakawa on June, 2016. Satoru Tsunakawa 
was succeeded by Nobuaki Kurumatani in April 2018. It should be noted the factional 
infighting between the chairperson, Nishida and his successor of CEO, Sasaki surfaced to 
the media. The power struggle was disparagingly depicted in the media. Management lost 
the consistent momentum and caused inner serpentine conflicts. Toshiba had no proper 
capability to redress a meandering disorientation. The Toshiba’s  grandiose scenario toward 
a global company almost stalled in top management infighting and artifice. 
Mounting Litigation
 On August 2015, CB & I sued Toshiba because the subsidiary of Toshiba, Westinghouse 
intended to cancel all the liabilities tied to Vogtle and VC Summer projects. After 
Westinghouse Electric Co. filed for bankruptcy, Southern Co. took the lead for the project 
which was stalemated. However, on September 2017, Scana Corp. and its partner, state-owned 
utility Santee Cooper filed for the lawsuit against Toshiba on grounds that the company was 
required to make the payment for the delay of construction. Santee Cooper sold to Citibank 
the bulk of their financial interests in the settlement related to unfinished reactors at the V.C. 
Summer nuclear station in the long run.(7) The lawsuit was also observed in Japan. The 
plummet of stock price of Toshiba caused many derivative lawsuits from many stockholders. 
On April, 2017 to date, the amount of compensation from plaintiffs totaled 50,5 billion yen. It 
was obvious that these lawsuits did immeasurable harms to the brand of Toshiba due to the 
exposure to the public through the media.
 
In the Wake of Pandemonium
Japan Arena
 It was announced that the consolidated loss of fiscal year 2016 was estimated about 965 
billion yen. Toshiba laid off more than 35,000 employees including the related companies 
during the turbulent years, 2016-2017. The total amount of sale plummeted from 5.1 trillion 
yen to 4.8 trillion yen during a short period of time, 2016-2017. At the heyday of Toshiba, the 
total sale amount achieved 7.6 trillion yen in 2007. 
 Under these circumstances, whether Toshiba can be revived as an innovative company 
with a cutting edge and global competitiveness has yet to be seen because the company lost 
prospective and invaluable business units to reinvigorate the sluggish company. The net 
(7) https://www.wsj.com/articles/citibank-buys-2-17-billion-toshiba-settlement-from-owners-of-south-carolina-
nuclear-plant-1506547327
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profit of consolidated fiscal year 2018 was estimated 800 billion yen, but it came from the 
profit on sale of Westinghouse Electric Co. Meanwhile, METI was not held accountable for 
the failure of overseas expansion nuclear power policy.
 It does not go too far to say that additional divesture would be implemented in the near 
future owing largely to the aftermath of huge loss from the U.S. based nuclear power 
constructions. Nevertheless, Toshiba continues to be involved in nuclear power business. 
The main core is maintenance and decommissioning operations: dismantling the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear reactors. It is allegedly stated that it will take approximately fifty years 
to finish demolishing these rectors, which enable Toshiba to ironically survive the going 
concern of organization in the long-term retreat scheme of nuclear power policy in the 
Japanese government. 
The U.S. Arena
 On August 2017, the parent company, Southern Company and its subsidiary, Georgia 
Power decided to continue with a troubled nuclear plant expansion project Vogtle 3 & 4, 
corresponding to the unanimous approval of Public Service Commission (PSC) and the huge 
governmental aids. The cost overruns exceeded 20 billion dollars. The construction of Vogtle 
3 & 4 was transferred from Toshiba to Bechtel. On January 2018, Westinghouse Electric Co. 
was bought out by Brookfield Business Partners, a private equity fund. On May, 2018, it was 
announced in a press release that Toshiba was to withdraw from the project to construct 
two of its advanced boiling water reactors (ABWR) of the South Texas Project (STP). On 
July, 2018, the V C Summer expansion project, South Carolina was shut down, leaving 5,000 
workers laid off. On August 2018, it was reported in the media that Toshiba intended to sell 
its interest in the Freeport LNG project which would incur additional liability. 
 However, negotiations are floundering because CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States) has not granted approval to Toshiba to sell the U.S. based LNG (liquefied 
natural gas) Division to a Chinese clean energy distributor company, ENN Energy Holding 
Limited ( 新奥能源控股有限公司 ) on grounds that the sale may impinge on the U.S. national 
security.  
Conclusion
 Toshiba had an excruciating business experiences over past ten years. The aftermath 
of ordeal has not abated. The management strategic solutions also has yet to be seen.  In 
2017, Toshiba was on the brink of the bankruptcy. Leading foreign banking institutions 
purchased a great deal of stocks of Toshiba which were markedly devalued. Consequently, 
the foreign stock ownership ratio of Toshiba to the Japanese counterpart rose to more 
than seventy percent. It goes without saying that Toshiba became a Japan-based foreign 
company. The new CEO, Nobuaki Kurumadani has not given a robust and creative business 
plan. Management of Toshiba bears the brunt of relentles discretions from the foreign 
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institutional shareholders and the relevant Japanese government offices. The convincing 
lesson of Toshiba debacle is that Toshiba should have made well-systematized feasible study 
of project management and due diligence with cautious scrutiny. The government-endorsed 
financing was also needed in parallel with the strict and transparent surveillance conducted 
by audit corporations. 
 There is a strong tendency that the overseas infrastructure project takes a longer period 
of time than expected because of sudden labor shortages, miscalcurated architecture design 
and the accompanying recurrent changes in spesifications. It is exemplified in this paper 
that the companies which are engaged in the colossal infrastructure project are apt to be 
under the unpredictable and uncontrollable conditions until implementation of long-standing 
project is successfully accomplished irrespective any countries(8) . 
 In retrospect, Toshiba made the same mistake as those of Mitsui Trading Company 
(Petrochemical factory construction of Iran-Japan Petroleum Company), Sony (M&A of 
Columbia Pictures), Mitsubishi Estate (M&A of Rockefeller Center Building) and Panasonic 
(M&A of Music Corporation of America) which collapsed in the 1990s. The failure of these 
cross national ventures resulted from the optimistic decision-making of top management 
with moon shot-oriented ambitious vision. Therefore, suffice it to say that the excruciating 
business stigma of Toshiba is not only a widespread ramification for the risk of the nuclear 
power business, but also a stepping stone for a further research concerning the risk of the 
post-merger integration.
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Postscript
 On November 19, 2018 when I finished proofreading the paper a couple days before submitting 
it to the university bulletin committee of Tama University, it was out of the blue announced 
in the media that the joint chairman of Nissan Motor, Renault, and Mitsubishi Motors, Calros 
Ghosn was arrested for an illegal stock pay (annual report misstatements) by the Tokyo District 
Public Prosecutor Office. The media incessantly censured him for the unauthorized moneymaker 
and modus operandi. However, the bottom line is that the scandal is deeply related to a polemic 
against a sanguine nature relating to the post-merger integration of M&A. The alliance of three 
car makers was considered as successful and praiseworthy.
 A prestigious, despotic, and international management charisma, Calros Ghosn who reigned 
over Nissan Motor about 19 years planned to set up a France-based holding company to make 
these three companies each independent company. This plan provoked the Japanese CEO of 
Nissan Motor, Hiroto Saikawa and other Japanese executives. Consequently, an inner plot in the 
top-echelon management was sub-rosa prepared and circumspectly implemented. The scheme 
conducted by Calros Ghosn was suddenly subverted. 
 It should be noted that the global business alliances have a deep relationship with political 
dynamics inside the participating multinational corporations and concomitant countries with the 
vested interests. He perpetrated a crime. Nonetheless, the arrest is a secondary matter. In sum, 
it can be said that the kernel of unprecedented scandals occasionally underlies the cross-national 
post-merger integration as is observed in the paper, “Ordeal of Toshiba”. 
